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A. PRELIMINARY SUMMARY
Particularly in light of recent developments in sovereign debt litigation, there is a pressing need for
discussion of more robust sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms. This paper contends that any
sovereign debt workout mechanism (DWM) should embody the principles of legitimacy and
impartiality, to the extent possible, in order to garner the stable and long-term adherence of
international stakeholders. These two elements are important both for attracting support ex ante,
i.e. in the initial development of any treaty, ad hoc, or soft law restructuring mechanism, and for
ensuring ex post that a DWM is ultimately utilized by states and their creditors. These principles
are particularly essential in the international arena, given the absence of a clear global enforcement
mechanism and in light of the historical resistance of some states and other institutional actors to
the development of a debt workout mechanism.
The first section of this background paper will introduce the key concepts of legitimacy and
impartiality, laying out different schools of thought on the characteristics of a legitimate and
impartial institutional order and developing a preliminary list of features appropriate for a DWM.
The second section will consider the institutional and historical background of debt restructuring in
light of these themes, to better understand the political and economic context of current discussions
of a possible workout mechanism. Third, this paper will consider how several domestic and
transnational institutions attempt to meet standards of legitimacy and impartiality, focusing
especially on domestic insolvency/debt restructuring institutions and on investment treaty
arbitration rules. Finally, this paper will offer preliminary recommendations for how a future
DWM might instantiate the principles of legitimacy and impartiality, and will briefly assess
existing proposals in light of these themes. This last section will also note several obstacles to
meeting the goals of legitimacy and impartiality, and ask whether the negative effect of such
impediments might be mitigated.
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B. THE KEY CONCEPTS OF LEGITIMACY AND IMPARTIALITY
This first section of the background paper will introduce the key concepts of legitimacy and
impartiality, laying out different approaches to defining the characteristics of a legitimate and
impartial order. It will propose a preliminary understanding that could be appropriate for thinking
about legitimacy and impartiality in the DWM context, based primarily on emerging interpretations
in international law and international relations.
This discussion considers impartiality to be a core factor within the more comprehensive category
of legitimacy, as well a valuable principle in its own right. 2 Particularly in the context of
international tribunals, impartiality and independence have been called “the most important
determinant of political legitimacy at the international level,” with legitimacy requiring that such
tribunals “be sufficiently independent of the powerful actors that dominate the political sphere to
take less powerful and minority interests into consideration.” 3 Thus, although, this section
considers these principles in sequence, the themes overlap and should be interpreted jointly.
B.1. Legitimacy in a DWM
Any successful DWM will have to command the respect and compliance of a multitude of
stakeholders across varying national and international institutional settings. Maximizing the degree
to which such stakeholders consider a DWM to be legitimate is essential to furthering its goals.
However, claiming legitimacy on behalf of a particular institution, mechanism, or rule is a fraught
exercise, given that the term’s content can be difficult to pin down. Indeed, “legitimacy speak” has
been soundly criticized by important international legal scholars for its indeterminacy and lack of
substance. 4 The goal of this discussion, then, is relatively circumscribed. It does not aim to
formulate a comprehensive or universal typology of legitimacy applicable across all arenas. 5
Rather, it presents a preliminary working understanding of institutional features that might render a
DWM more (or less) legitimate in the current, complex global context. The final determination of
which elements are ultimately included in a DWM is of course a matter to be negotiated among
key global stakeholders. It involves decision-making that will necessarily be embedded within the
broader goals of pragmatic feasibility, timeliness, and cost effectiveness.
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The interrelated nature of these elements, in the view of the UNCTAD Working Group on a Debt Workout
Mechanism, is suggested by their joint assignment for discussion in this background paper, although impartiality is
listed as a standalone principle for a DWM as well. UNCTAD, Debt Workout Mechanism Framing Paper, 2
September 2013. Available at: http://www.unctad.info/upload/Framing%20Paper%2027%20August_finalwithlogo.pdf.
3
Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, “Prospects for the Increased Independence of International Tribunals,”
German Law Journal, vol. 12, no. 5, 1057-1082 (2011), 1058.
4
James Crawford, “The Problems of Legitimacy-Speak,” ASIL Proceedings (2004, vol. 98), 271, 271 (noting the
“fuzziness and indeterminacy” of the term); see also Martti Koskenniemi has suggested that “ ‘Legitimacy’ is not about
normative substance. Its point is to avoid such substance but nonetheless to uphold a semblance of substance.” Martti
Koskenniemi, “Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law,” European Journal of
International Relations, vol. 15 (2009), 395, 409.
5
Indeed, understandings of legitimacy are necessarily variable and historically grounded. For a study of how shifts in
conceptions of legitimacy ground systemic change in international society, see Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International
Society (Oxford, 2005). Joseph Weiler suggests that forms of international law-making, including the legitimacy
arguments with which they are associated, is best understood not as periodization but rather, drawing from geology, as
stratification, in which sediments of past practices continue into the present. Joseph Weiler, “The Geology of
International Law—Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy,” ZaöRV 64 (2004), 547-562.
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Basic Definition and Preliminary Considerations
Basic Definition
Legitimacy can be understood as an attribute of a rule, mechanism, norm, or institution that makes
it worthy of considered and voluntary compliance and/or support. Approval and compliance result
from the initial understanding of the rule or mechanism as ‘legitimate,’ rather than from coercion,
habit, self-interest, or other possible reasons for action.6 Part of the special virtue or power of a
legitimate rule thus lies in its capacity to effectively coordinate preferences and decisions even in
the absence of other bases for action. This becomes especially important in the international
arena—including for a globally supported debt workout mechanism—where no supranational
authority with broadly accepted powers of coercion exists. As will be discussed more fully,
legitimacy may derive from the initial source of, ongoing process of, or ultimate substantive
outcome resulting from a rule, mechanism, or institution, or from some combination of these three
basic components.
The Broad Audience for Legitimacy
The importance of legitimacy as a basis for action has long been understood in the social sciences
and in legal studies. For example, Max Weber formulated a definition relevant for sociological
theory that states that “a norm or institutional arrangement is legitimate if, as a matter of fact, it
finds the approval of those who are supposed to live in this group.”7 Thomas Franck proposed a
working definition of legitimacy intended for international law and international relations, initially
formulated to apply among states, as “a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself
exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe
that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted
principles of right process.”8 In the last several decades, questions of legitimacy have become even
more central in both academic and policy writing, and scholars and activists have built upon and
extended these themes.9 In one recent influential article, Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane
emphasize that the concept of legitimacy appeals to a “common capacity to be moved by what
might be called normative reasons,” and a “complex belief” that institutions may deserve support
even if they fail to maximize self-interest and also fall short of (inevitably divergent)
understandings of perfect justice.10
Central to these formulations is the idea that conforming action is motivated by the legitimacy of
the mechanism itself through the belief or normative approval of the relevant audience. This
interactive element leads to several preliminary implications:
6

See, for example, Christopher A. Thomas, “The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law,” 24-29.
Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, as quoted (and translated) in Lukas H.
Meyer and Pranay Sanklecha, “Introduction: Legitimacy, justice and public international law. Three perspectives on
the debate,” in Lukas H. Meyer, ed., Legitimacy, Justice, and Public International Law (Cambridge University Press,
2009), 2.
8
Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Oxford University Press (1990), 24.
9
See, among others, Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law (Cambridge
University Press, 2010); Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker Röben, Legitimacy in International Law (Springer 2008); Lukas
H. Meyer, ed., Legitimacy, Justice, and Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
10
Allen Buchanan & Robert Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,” in Rüdiger Wolfrum and
Volker Röben, eds., Legitimacy in International Law (Springer 2008), 30, 31-32.
7

3



First, the relevant audience for legitimacy purposes in a DWM should include all those
affected by a rule, norm, or institution—i.e. all of those normatively addressed by the rule
or living in the group to which the rule or mechanism applies. This audience encompasses
those without the position or power to enact or enforce rules, including citizens of countries
undergoing a debt workout and small creditors who may have had minimal voice in the
restructuring process.
o This accords with one of the general goals of establishing a legitimate order, i.e.
ensuring voluntary adherence by all relevant actors to the extent possible. This
includes those individuals who may not have participated in either institutional
design or particular restructuring processes, but who are nonetheless affected by
their outcomes and who may therefore object to or impede implementation once
decisions are made.



This broader definition of the relevant audience for (and determiner of) legitimacy differs
somewhat from conventional understandings of international decision-makers, and can be
understood as a distinctive feature of any focus on legitimacy for a DWM. The assessment
of legitimacy is not made just by those with sufficient power to compel compliance, such as
the sovereign states, major creditors, or international bodies involved in high-level
negotiations. It thus suggests that attention should also be paid to the likely concerns of
less traditionally central individuals or groups, who are implicated in determining
legitimacy but who are not usually involved in international discussions.



The determination that a broad audience is relevant for assessing legitimacy does not mean
that universal acceptance or adherence is required. For example, it is possible that certain
actors will remain intransigent or obfuscating even in the face of a rule, institution, or
outcome generally determined to be legitimate, in which case opposition might well be
considered illegitimate. However, care should be taken when drawing these lines,
particularly given the political import and distributional impact of claims about legitimacy
or illegitimacy.

Multiple Bases for Legitimacy and Impartiality
Given these basic contours for understanding legitimacy, where should we look for particular
features or characteristics that might enhance DWM legitimacy? This is relevant for formulating
the key features of impartiality as well. One place to find these features may be traditions of
international law that explicitly address questions of governance and authority. However, the fact
of a broad audience for DWM legitimacy, including not only lawyers but also other decisionmakers and publics, suggests that key characteristics may be found beyond legal frameworks alone.
This is because different audience groups may privilege alternative approaches besides legality in
assessing legitimacy.
International Law and Global Governance
To begin with, there is an important overlap between this formulation of legitimacy in the DWM
context and approaches within international law and global governance that focus on the exercise
of authority over broad publics. These include the traditions of International Public Authority (IPA)
4

and Global Administrative Law (GAL), which pay special attention to situations in which those
most affected by key decisions are not necessarily the decision-makers themselves, either directly
or through clear lines of representation. Appropriately, international public law has been identified
as the core legal framework for the UNCTAD initiative on a DWM, given that it implicates the
coordination of public authorities in the provision of global public goods.11 While other legal
traditions exist as well (i.e. global constitutionalism), the IPA and GAL schools of thought offer
frameworks that are especially pertinent.
International Public Authority: Previous research produced by members of the UNCTAD
Working Group has explicitly argued that sovereign debt restructuring can be understood as an
exercise of international public authority. While it is not necessary to restate those findings in full
here, public authority in this framework is understood to exist when “the author of an authoritative
act may claim to have acted on a legal basis entitling it to enact unilateral decisions which deeply
affect individuals or communities.”12
One key ramification of such a classification is that the act should be legitimated by satisfying the
requirements of international public law. Although the authors are careful to note the absence of a
clearly binding treaty to regulate the legal legitimacy of debt restructuring, and also acknowledge
the absence of any objectively right understanding of ‘justice,’ they highlight the possibility of an
“incremental emergence of legal concepts and principles” that might nonetheless be relevant.13 In
the arena of debt restructuring, they note that issues of competence, procedural fairness, review,
and basic human rights should be considered. 14 Certain of these elements feature in the
consideration of legitimacy presented in this background paper as well.
Global Administrative Law: A related framework for understanding authoritative global action is
presented by Global Administrative Law. The approach of global administrative law is understood
to involve “the mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that
promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies.”15 Subjects of this
area of law include formal and informal bodies that exercise “transnational governance functions of
particular public significance,” and which “regulate and manage vast sectors of economic and
social life through specific decisions and rulemaking.” 16 Key bodies and intergovernmental
networks involved in sovereign debt restructuring are deeply embedded in this form of global
governance, and the practices and decisions that result certainly have broad public impact. As such,
sovereign debt issues may well be understood to implicate global administrative law.
As with the IPA framework, understanding sovereign debt workouts as implicating global
administrative law leads to ramifications for thinking through legitimacy in this arena. In
particular, GAL draws from domestic law principles to suggest that bodies and activities subject to
GAL should meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality,
11

UNCTAD Framing Paper, n. 2, 3.
Armin von Bogdandy and Matthias Goldmann, “Sovereign Debt Restructurings as Exercises of International Public
Authority,” in Carlos Esposito, Yuefen Li, and Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, ed., Sovereign Financing and International
Law: The UNCTAD Principles on Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing (Oxford University Press, 2014), 46.
13
Id., 53.
14
Id., 55.
15
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law,” Law &
Contemporary Problems, vol. 68, 15-61 (2005), 17.
16
Id., 17.
12
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and should also allow for effective review of resulting rules and decisions.17 This background
paper thus includes certain doctrinal features of GAL as elements that may enhance DWM
legitimacy.
The Need for a Plurality of Traditions
While it is clear that the principles and practices suggested by explicitly legal frameworks should
ground the approach taken here, a more comprehensive study of DWM legitimacy and impartiality
must also be open to other approaches. 18 Within the larger definition of legitimacy, there are
generally understood to be multiple sub-categories, including legal, moral, social, and political
legitimacy.19 Although sovereign debt workouts can be characterized as having a legal basis and
implicating legal standards, they also may be understood through a social and political lens. Thus,
possible features or characteristics for a legitimate rule or order should also be drawn from the
social sciences and from social and political theory. This is in line with the flexible and
multidisciplinary framework laid out in UNCTAD’s Debt Workout Framing Paper.20
A plurality of approaches to legitimacy and impartiality in a DWM, including an explicit embrace
of multi- or interdisciplinarity, is also important given the subjective/interactive element of
legitimacy. Although this discussion paper has thus far referred to an ‘audience’ for legitimacy, in
practice this audience is likely to be composed of multiple groups, whether the issue is the initial
establishment of a transnational DWM or a particular instance of debt restructuring. These
multiple groups (and different individuals within those groups) will likely have varying
perspectives on the relevance and importance of one or another approach to legitimacy. For
example, trained international lawyers or national courts and arbitral tribunals may appropriately
be persuaded by arguments framed principally through legal legitimacy.21 Conversely, politicians
and policy officials, economists, and other social scientists—who will also play a role in the
approval and use of any DWM—may feel unmoved by such argumentation, and may find
assertions framed through economic-utilitarian or political understandings of legitimacy more
convincing. Individual citizens, relatively distanced from disciplinarily informed understandings,
will likely consider legitimacy through inchoate and general views of fairness, perhaps linked more
closely to the principle of impartiality. Each of these constituencies, along with many others, are
part of the broad audience for determining the legitimacy (and therefore impacting the efficacy) of
a DWM.
In aiming for the broadest possible consideration and acceptance, this background paper pays
special attention to emergent legal principles but also draws from a plurality of other traditions in
identifying key features that might enhance DWM legitimacy and impartiality. Again, this follows
the flexible and multidisciplinary approach laid out by the Framing Paper.22
17

Id., 17, 37-42.
Indeed, even within international law, we see competing understandings of law and legitimacy. See, e.g., Harlan
Grant Cohen, “Finding International Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal Community,” NYU Journal of International
Law and Politics, vol. 44 (2012), 1049-1107.
19
For one recent discussion that offers a helpful typology and focuses on the various uses of legitimacy in international
law, see Thomas, “Uses and Abuses,” n. 6.
20
UNCTAD DWM Framing Paper, n. 2, 2.
21
For a careful consideration of the relationship between legality and legitimacy, see generally Brunnée and Toope,
Legitimacy and Legality, n. 9.
22
Id., 2.
18
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Components of Legitimacy: Source, Process, and Outcome
The preceding discussion should make clear that determining one limited set of indicators for
legitimacy (or impartiality) would be overly simplistic. Indeed, for any context and historical
moment, legitimacy can be understood as “a composite of, and an accommodation between, a
number of other norms, both procedural and substantive.”23
This section thus lays out key features that could contribute to this composite legitimacy. Drawing
from multiple schools of thought, there are three main approaches to legitimation. 24 These
correspond to three questions relevant for the formulation of a DWM:


Source Legitimacy: How is the DWM, or particular rules associated with the DWM, to be
formulated and by whom? A rule, mechanism, or institution will likely be considered more
legitimate if its source and initial establishment satisfies the key values of the legitimating
group(s).



Process Legitimacy: Once the DWM is established, are the processes by which it works in
line with broadly accepted procedural standards, including standards specified by emerging
international law? The ongoing process or procedure through which an institution works or
a rule is implemented, as distinct from either the initial development of the rule or its results,
may also confer legitimacy.



Outcome or Substantive Legitimacy: Is the DWM able to generate successful outcomes,
understood in terms of substantive goals? Aside from considerations on the source or
process front, an institution or rule may be considered legitimate if it generates desired
outcomes. Key follow-up questions here include how to define and determine positive
substantive outcomes, and also who should make this assessment.

Again, given the large and multiple audiences for DWM legitimacy, different groups may put more
or less weight on particular levels/understandings of legitimacy. A DWM that is designed to
satisfy the key requirements at each level should be considered most legitimate by the broadest
possible audience. Of course, there may be tensions between particular legitimizing characteristics
(such as maximum efficiency and broad participation), which would have to be balanced at a
general institutional level and within any particular workout situation. And again, the principle of
impartiality can play a role at each of these levels, particularly in relation to those features of
legitimacy that implicate stakeholder participation and fair decision-making.
Source (or Establishment) Legitimacy
One central understanding of legitimacy involves a focus on how a rule, mechanism, or rule-giving
institution is originally established. To the extent that this initial establishment falls in line with
23

Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, n. 5, 207.
This organizational framework and language is selected to be relatively simple, colloquial, and appropriate for the
issue area. For related typologies applied in different applications, see Vivien A. Schmidt, “Democracy and Legitimacy
in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput’,” Political Studies vol. 61 (2013) 2-22; Thomas,
“Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy,” n. 6.

24
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core values of the applicable audience or community, then the rule or institution should be
considered more legitimate. There are several possible ways to think through DWM legitimacy at
the source level.
State Consent: The classic legitimating mode in international law and global relations is state
consent. In this traditional view, states are considered the key actors/creators of international law
as well as their primary (and perhaps only) subjects. Their explicit contractual/transactional
consent, for example in a hard law treaty or in agreeing to a particular limitation of their
sovereignty, is necessary and in some cases sufficient for source legitimacy under this view.
Although this approach has been soundly criticized, in particular for failing to consider the
legitimacy/illegitimacy of states themselves, it remains a pertinent standard for source legitimacy
in international law and global affairs.25
Democratic Legitimation: A central legitimating framework in many nations, which is
increasingly discussed at the global level as well, is that of democracy. Here, the legitimacy of a
rule, mechanism, or governance body is only achieved if it is grounded in the support and input
(either directly or through representatives) of the underlying people or citizens. Such support,
offered through majoritarian electoral institutions or other mechanisms, can legitimately bind even
those not in favor of a particular rule. One vision of global democracy might characterize all the
globe’s inhabitants as citizens, and attempt to directly aggregate their voices through a mechanism
that bypasses states and other intermediaries. However, this latter approach is far from workable at
this point, even were it normatively desirable. A general attentiveness to the voices of individuals
(rather than only states or other group entities), however, may offer some element of democratic
legitimacy to a DWM.
Participatory Legitimation: Less demanding than strict democratic legitimation, this would aim
for the participation of important (and potentially divergent) groups in the initial establishment of a
DWM or the propagation of associated rules. This approach does not strictly specify the identity of
the stakeholders or the mechanism of participation/control. However, it does mandate that a good
faith effort be made to identify and involve an appropriately broad array of stakeholders through
meaningful participatory mechanisms, which are likely to be representative. 26 Central to this
legitimating element is the principle that participatory mechanisms should be impartial, i.e. not
favoring or biased toward one particular group. This form of source legitimacy bears some
similarity to the procedures and concerns of process/implementation legitimacy discussed below,
though applied to the earlier point of DWM/rule establishment.
25

For criticisms of the state consent model, see Buchanan and Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance
Institutions,” n. 10, 35-36; von Bogdandy and Goldmann, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring,” n. 12, 48. However,
Benedict Kingsbury highlights the distributional ramifications of a commitment to sovereign state equality and state
consent, noting that “a decline in the traditional sovereign system weakens the relationship of mutual containment
between sovereignty and inequality.” Benedict Kingsbury, “Sovereignty and Inequality,” in Inequality, Globalization,
and World Politics, ed. Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 92. And as
Joseph Weiler points out, even those norms grounded in earlier ideological periods may still have some resonance
today. Weiler, n. 5.
26
Along these lines, Terence Halliday highlights the potential importance of what he calls a representative basis for the
legitimacy of international organizations, which involves “persuading prospective audiences that future products of an
organization have been formulated by actors that share their interests or attributes.” Terence C. Halliday, “Legitimacy,
Technology, and Leverage: The Building Blocks of Insolvency Architecture in the Decade Past and the Decade Ahead,”
Brooklyn Journal of International Law, vol. 32 (2006-2007), 1084.
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Expertise/Authority: A final form of source legitimacy can derive from expertise or authority; i.e.
if accepted authority figures play central roles in developing rules or institutions, then the rules
may be considered legitimate. Classic forms of authority-based source legitimacy involve
religion/moral codes, science/technical expertise, monarchy/traditional government, and law
(originally natural law but now other forms of law that might be considered authoritative). Deeper
questions of the underlying basis for such authority or expertise are left aside here; the proper
authority of religious figures, for example, is well beyond the scope of this paper. However, to the
extent that such authority/expertise is understood to exist—for example in economics, international
relations, insolvency mechanisms, and applicable international law—it may be relevant for
maximizing the source legitimacy of a DWM.
 In general, source legitimacy drawn from this basis will only appeal to specific sub-groups
that validate the relevant authority. However, certain forms of authority—such as that
grounded in scientific/technical expertise—can be more broadly accepted, and therefore the
participation and support of these experts may enhance DWM input legitimacy. In addition,
it may be worth appealing to other more specialized authority figures in discussion of a
DWM with certain groups.
Process (or Implementation) Legitimacy:
A second level of legitimacy can be understood as process or implementation legitimacy. Once a
DWM (or associated rule) is actually established, the nature of its implementation and ongoing
functioning may also impact its legitimacy. In particular, processes that adhere to certain
procedural standards, including those that guard the impartiality of the DWM and its decisionmakers, may grant the DWM greater legitimacy in the eyes of key constituents. These standards
are central to the traditions and emerging legal principles of international public authority and
global administrative law, discussed above.
One key caveat to keep in mind in terms of process, however, is that certain generally desirable
elements—for example, broad participation and transparency—may be less feasible in certain
emergency or crisis management situations. As such, the establishment of any DWM should likely
include a discussion of whether modified procedures are appropriate for such situations, and a
mechanism for delineating when the application of a modified process may be warranted.
Ongoing Participation: Even after an institution or rule has been established, the participatory
ideal that undergirds one form of source legitimation (mentioned above) can continue to play a role.
In line with ideas of procedural fairness, the ongoing involvement and input of affected individuals
and groups, particularly before key decisions are made, can enhance DWM legitimacy. Such
participation could work through either direct access or representative structures. In order to
ensure the presence of a broad array of voices, participatory processes may also allow for input
from third parties (such as NGOs) acting as amici curiae.
More specifically, this could involve the opportunity to be heard or provide comments on, among
other issues, possible restructuring plans and the allowance/disallowance of debt claims. The
notice and comment procedures present in administrative law and specified in the GAL framework,
along with the claim allowance procedure in some domestic insolvency proceedings, may provide
guidance on this front. The mechanisms for ongoing participation should ideally strive to be
impartial, not inappropriately privileging one or another viewpoint.
9

Ownership: One exception to this general preference for impartial procedures would be a special
attentiveness to the concerns of the sovereign debtor undergoing a restructuring, including an
allowance of debtors controlling the process when fair to other parties. Country “ownership” of
adjustment programs, particularly those mandated by IFIs, have been considered an important
element of process legitimacy in global governance frameworks and is relevant to a DWM.
 This comports with ongoing commitments to self-determination and sovereign control,
which remain an overarching principle in international law, particularly attended to by less
powerful countries in the global arena.
 Like process legitimacy itself, country ownership also has instrumental value: “[P]rogram
ownership, by reflecting a firm commitment from the government, implies that the difficult
policy measures… are more likely to be implemented.”27
Comprehensiveness/Full Involvement: A general problem in any governance system, especially at
the global level, is likely to be the lack of collective action among disparate parties. This certainly
is the case in sovereign debt issues, and creditor uncoordination and forum fragmentation has been
identified as a key problem to be addressed by a DWM in the UNCTAD Framing Document.28
The formulation and successful implementation of procedures that address collective action and
coordination problems will likely enhance the process legitimacy of any DWM. Thus the goal here
is not just to ensure that there is an opportunity to participate (through transparency and comment
opportunities, for example) but also that all relevant parties in fact do participate to the extent
possible.
 This would also serve to promote impartiality or the limitation of bias/preference (discussed
more fully below). To the extent that all claims are dealt with at once, the identification
and correction of any bias or preference across creditors can be dealt with.
 This element is likely to have an impact on outcome legitimacy as well, as comprehensive
involvement by relevant parties is more likely to result in a final resolution of debt claims, a
return to economic growth, and an enhanced capacity to access capital markets at better
rates.
Transparency: Transparency has already been established as a general principle that should govern
any DWM, and has been well covered in a previous background paper.29 It supports the general
goal of process legitimacy as well. To begin with, it is a precondition for ongoing participation, as
it allows for the dissemination of information and possible courses of action about which parties
may have an opinion. Furthermore, it allows stakeholders to determine whether the functioning of
the institution or mechanism is in line with its goals and is likely to result in positive outcomes.
Agencies involved in global governance, including the IMF and the World Bank, have made efforts
to improve their transparency (including through greater provision of internal documents).
27

Mohsin S. Khan and Sunil Sharma, “Reconciling Conditionality and Country Ownership,” Finance & Development,
vol. 39, no. 2 (June 2002); see also J.H. Johnson, “Borrower Ownership of Adjustment Programs and the Political
Economy of Reform,” World Bank Discussion Paper No. 199 (1992).
28
UNCTAD Framing Document, n. 2, 3.
29
Matthias Goldmann, “Good Faith and Transparency in Sovereign Debt Workouts,” Paper Prepared for the Second
Session of the UNCTAD Working Group on a Debt Workout Mechanism, 23 January 2014. See especially 17-23. In
addition, it has been highlighted as a general principle of Global Administrative Law and an important emerging
feature of international law and global governance. See Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, n. 15, 37-39; Andrea Bianchi
and Anne Peters, Transparency in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Alexandru Grigorescu,
“Transparency of Intergovernmental Organizations,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 51 (2007).

10

Reasoned Decision: Closely related to the ideal of transparency is the process of reason-giving, i.e.
clarifying the reasons for particular decisions, including providing the analytical and
informational/evidentiary foundations underpinning final outcomes. This helps to ensure that the
views of various stakeholders have in fact been taken into account, and that improper bases for
decision-making have not impacted the outcome.
Efficiency: One element of process or implementation legitimacy may be the efficiency of the
procedures themselves. Parties will be more likely to accept an institution, rule, or mechanism if
the procedures with which it is associated do not divert undue time and attention away from the
pursuit of other important goals. This also implicates outcome legitimacy, as even generally
positive results (e.g. a return to debt sustainability or achieving satisfactory levels of socioeconomic rights) will be undermined if they are not achieved in a reasonably timely fashion.
The phrasing of Principle 15 of the UNCTAD Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign
Lending and Borrowing, which requires that any restructuring “should be undertaken promptly,
efficiently, and fairly,” very explicitly incorporates this element.30
Review: The possibility of review by an external entity of the procedures and decisions of a DWM
may help to support fair and impartial processes as well as outcome legitimacy. Improper biases or
procedural irregularities could be corrected for or possibly compensated and, perhaps more
importantly, the possibility of review can encourage internal monitoring by parties and others
involved in DWM processes.31 In addition, external review may help to ensure that restructuring
outcomes comply with substantive principles and goals.
Outcome or Substantive Legitimacy:
A final set of standards for legitimacy of a DWM may involve the ability to generate successful
outcomes, understood in terms of substantive goals. The capacity of a rule, institution, or
mechanism to produce results that satisfy the needs or desires of relevant constituencies will almost
always confer an important degree of legitimacy.32 Of course, it is unlikely that any institution or
rule produces absolutely optimal outcomes; however, the mechanism in question must meet a
minimum threshold of results to be acceptable.33 The type of outcome that characterizes ‘success’
necessarily varies across issue area, but several possibilities are especially relevant for a DWM.
Economic/Financial Outcomes: Positive economic/financial results feature importantly in the
outcome legitimacy of any institution or mechanism that deals with economic issues. From the
sovereign debtor perspective, a successful DWM outcome would involve a return to debt
sustainability and economic growth, and perhaps also an eventual improvement in creditworthiness
and return to capital market access. From a creditor perspective, it would involve reasonable
30

UNCTAD, Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, 10 January 2012. Available at:
http://www.unctad.info/upload/Debt%20Portal/Principles%20drafts/SLB_Principles_English_Doha_22-04-2012.pdf.
31
See, e.g., Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, n. 15; Theodor Meron, “Judicial Independence and Impartiality in
International Criminal Tribunals,” American Journal of International Law, vol. 99, no. 2 (April 2005), 361.
32
In the EU context, this is called “output legitimacy” by Fritz Scharpf, Vivien Schmidt, and others. Fritz Scharpf,
Governing in Europe (Oxford University Press, 1999); Vivien Schmidt, n. 24.
33
Buchanan and Keohane refer to this more instrumental perspective as a concern with “comparative benefit” as
compared to other possible institutions (or presumably as compared to the absence of an institution, if that is the
alternative). Buchanan and Keohane, n. 10, 46-47.
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recovery on an investment. Outcome considerations calibrated according to more specific
standards (for instance, approaches associated with ‘global justice’ advocated by certain groups)
may consider other economic results to be desirable, such as global redistribution of wealth. Asset
recovery may also feature as a desirable financial outcome, and could partially relieve the need for
creditor losses.
 As part of positive economic/financial outcomes, a key facet of outcome legitimacy, a
DWM should deal as best as possible with the problem of debtor procrastination, identified
as a key issue by the DWM Framing Document.34 Procedures that encourage states to
make use of the DWM process at a sufficiently early point—while not pushing states to
restructure when it is not necessary—are likely to result in better economic outcomes. This
includes limitation of any stigma attached to a debt workout, to the extent possible, which
may aggravate procrastination.
 Debtors may want to regain access to capital markets relatively swiftly after a restructuring.
Thus, it may be desirable for any DWM to include a mechanism by which restructured
sovereign debtor can demonstrate to the market its economic soundness and willingness to
make debt payments (two key components of creditworthiness).
Human Impact: Any global governance institution will likely be judged in part according to basic
human impact in the restructuring country.
 Within this, alternative approaches might focus on a simple concern for human impact,
versus the active promotion/improvement of on-the-ground outcomes for individuals .
 In addition, there may be questions as to which standards (i.e. for political, civil, or socioeconomic well-being) are sufficiently established and internationally appropriate to ground
outcome judgments of a DWM.35
Adherence to other Substantive Principles: Aside from human impact outcomes, consistency with
other substantive principles or doctrines may be relevant to judging outcomes. These might
include unclean hands, unconscionability, fraudulent transfer, and concerns about governmental
responsiveness to and responsibility for underlying populations.
Consistency across Cases: One final feature of DWM outcome legitimacy might involve an
assessment of the degree to which there is consistency across cases of sovereign debt restructuring.
Such consistency would enhance the predictability and stability of markets, a benefit for both
sovereign borrowers and investors alike.
 This consistency is currently undermined by forum fragmentation and by variations in (and
possibly inconsistent interpretations of) the laws, principles, and procedures that apply to
debt restructurings.
 As a cautionary note, however, it is important to keep in mind that consistent application of
a substandard mechanism, perhaps leading to uniformly problematic results, is not
necessarily favorable in and of itself. As such, consistency may perhaps be understood as a
subsidiary standard.
 In addition, given the political, social, and economic variability that can exist among
sovereign debt situations, any DWM should likely not focus on consistency at the expense
of an attentiveness to the situation at hand.
34

UNCTAD Framing Document, n. 2, at 3.
Along these lines, Buchanan and Keohane refer to “minimal moral acceptability” and a “non-violation of human
rights.” Buchanan and Keohane, n. 10, 46.
35
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Note on Distributional Ramifications of a Process or Outcome Focus
The assertion of legitimacy on behalf of a rule or rule-making body can have power in its own right,
suggesting important distributional ramifications in the global arena. As such, it is important to
highlight how emphasizing one understanding of legitimacy over another can itself have impact,
and to incorporate legitimating features drawn from multiple approaches.
Risks of Source or Process Focus: A DWM oriented toward source or process legitimacy may have
the effect of inadvertently privileging powerful players more fully in control of such procedures.
 More specifically, certain actors will inevitably have a greater capacity to engage in the
initial formulation of a DWM and to participate in any given debt restructuring. This is due
to variation in terms of actor knowledge/expertise and also in terms of resources—including
financial resources and the availability of trained individuals who could participate on
behalf of interested parties. This is the case across international actors and states, which
may differ significantly in their capacity to provide initial feedback in the formulation of a
DWM and also to engage with ongoing restructuring processes. It is also the case across
different socio-economic actors within any given country (i.e. financial groups, government
agencies, individuals impacted by welfare programs) and across various transnational
groups (including different types/sizes of creditors).
 Emphasizing source and process as the basis for legitimacy could thus potentially magnify
the impact of this capacity variation as, in the absence of appropriate safeguards, more
capable actors may have disproportionately greater voice in sovereign debt.36
Risks of Outcome Focus: A focus on substantive outcomes as the basis for legitimacy may also
have distributional impact, in particular by granting control to those claiming an ability to deliver
the desirable outcome.
 It is obviously difficult to fully control or ensure the outcome of any restructuring through a
DWM. Furthermore, it may not be easy to secure the agreement of various parties on the
particular substantive goals of any transnational institution, including a DWM.37 However,
to the extent that a desirable outcome is identified, powerful actors may shape the initial
DWM establishment or particular debt restructurings by promising a favorable substantive
outcome. In the meantime, they may ask other stakeholders to minimize their process
36

Or, in other words, the public goods of transparency, information, and openness, while generally desirable and
applicable, are arguably most beneficial to those who can best take advantage of them, and so can inadvertently skew
outcomes in their favor. This is part of the basis for criticisms of Global Administrative Law and related approaches
by proponents of ‘Third World Approaches to International Law’ and other writers explicitly concerned with global
justice. For example, B.S. Chimni argues that “without a concurrent concern with substantive law, GAL may only
legitimize unjust laws and institutions. By focusing exclusively on GAL, a false impression may arise that existing
international institutions are becoming more participatory and responsive to the concerns of developing countries and
their peoples.” B.S. Chimni, “Co-option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law,” NYU Journal of
International Law and Politics, vol. 37 (2006), 800. Writing in the context of the WTO, Greg Shaffer similarly notes
that “process-based review also raises serious concerns, in particular, because processes can be manipulated to give the
appearance of consideration of affected foreigners without in any way modifying a predetermined outcome….
Powerful actors can thus go through the steps of due process without meaningfully considering the views of the
affected parties.” Greg Shaffer, “Power, Governance and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional Approach,” in Power
in Global Governance, Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall, eds. (Cambridge, 2005), 130-161.
37
This difficulty in identifying clear substantive outcomes to which all can agree is part of the reason for caution in the
legal approaches mentioned above. See, for example, von Bogdandy and Goldmann, n. 12, 55.
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legitimacy requests. In this way, a DWM or a particular debt restructuring can be
constructed in favor of these actors, regardless of whether the desirable outcome is ever
actually delivered.
The pressures that favor a focus on substantive outcome can be especially acute in
emergency or crisis management debt workout situations. In these cases, certain elements
of process legitimacy (i.e. broad participation, transparency) are impracticable or may even
be considered undesirable. Where a more strict focus on outcome is appropriate or
inevitable, some degree of accountability for those actors given control of the situation
could be considered suitable. This would have to balanced against the uncertainty and lack
of guarantee inherent in any debt restructuring.

Importance of Balance: In light of these considerations about distributional impact and power
imbalances, which are difficult to avoid in the global arena, it is especially important to remain
open to multiple bases of legitimacy. More specific discussions might cover:
 Broad stakeholder involvement, with a special attention to seeking out marginalized voices:
In the formulation of a DWM and in its ongoing procedures, discussion with a broad group
of stakeholders may help. Special effort could be made to seek out those voices that might
be under-represented due to power or capacity issues.
 Amici & Ombudsman: A DWM could be especially attentive to amici who may be able to
speak on behalf of under-represented groups. In addition, the appointment of an
ombudsman or special representative for certain groups might be appropriate in some
restructurings.
B.2. Impartiality
A central cognate to legitimacy in the international arena is the ideal or principle of impartiality.
Impartiality has already been mentioned as an element of several of the legitimating features
mentioned above, but deserves further explication.
Basic Definition
Impartiality can be understood as a way of thinking, decision-making or acting that is free of bias
or preference and which is grounded in independence and objectivity. 38 It is an essential
component of colloquial understandings of justice and fairness. Impartiality may be compromised
by biases or preferences grounded in national, regional, political/ideological, or personal affiliation.
Although these biases are perhaps most easily cognizable in how individuals think and act, they
can also impact how institutions are established and can therefore affect institutional goals and
operating processes.
As a central underpinning of legitimacy, impartiality plays a role not only through actual
objectivity and independence, but also through perceptions/acknowledgment of objectivity and
independence by relevant constituencies. In other words, the interactive/audience element of

38

Steven Ratner, for example, describes impartiality as “a way that individuals and institutions decide and act, one
based on disinterestedness, consistency, and fairness and not merely personal motives.” Steven R. Ratner, “Do
international organizations play favorites? An impartialist account,” in Meyer, ed., n. 9, 128.
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legitimacy discussed above translates to impartiality as well.39 Although complete impartiality
(like universal legitimacy) is exceedingly difficult and perhaps impossible to achieve, impartiality
remains an important guiding principle for any DWM.
Elements of Impartiality
This section thus lays out key considerations for enhancing the impartiality of an institution or
governance mechanism more generally. These are organized according to the potential impact of
particular features on institutional impartiality, actor impartiality, and what I call informational
impartiality. Each of these elements may be relevant for developing an appropriately independent
and objective DWM, as will be discussed more fully below.
Institutional impartiality
To maximize impartiality, any institutional framework should be constructed to avoid systematic
bias in favor of one or another interested group. Several sub-features support this larger goal, some
of which overlap with process legitimacy characteristics discussed above.
 Institutional Independence: To increase impartiality and also the public perception of
impartiality, governance institutions and mechanisms ideally minimize their affiliation with
parties/groups that might be affected by the institution’s processes or decisions.
o This might include attentiveness to financial independence, personnel independence,
and perhaps physical independence (i.e. geographic location in a neutral setting).
This would be especially important to the extent that any DWM takes the shape of a
more permanent organization, rather than working through ad hoc settings.
 Transparency and Review: As with process legitimacy above, transparency and review
procedures can enhance impartiality by making an institution’s inner workings more visible
to interested parties, and by serving as a check on those procedures. Bias that exists can be
more easily identified and corrected.
Actor Impartiality
To the extent that any DWM envisions a central role for third party decision-makers, be they
mediators/facilitators or adjudicators, it is important to ensure the impartiality of these actors.
 Actor Independence: Perhaps the central feature of actor impartiality involves ensuring that
decision-makers/mediators are independent of the negotiating parties, both individually and
certainly taken as a group (in multi-party decision-making situations).40 As part of this,
decision-maker disclosure requirements may be appropriate.
 Reasoned Decision: Clarifying the rationale for any decision can help to support actor
impartiality. This practice ensures that the decision-maker clarifies for herself or himself
that the underlying reasons are impartial, and also allows other actors to provide a check on
any bias that may exist.
 Multi-Person Decision-Making: The involvement of multiple individuals in any decision
can help to mitigate actor bias, as decisions will have to be discussed and justified. This
39

The desirability of drawing from a plurality of traditions and standards, discussed in the context of legitimacy above,
is applicable to the principle of impartiality as well, given that it will be judged by the same multiple audiences.
40
This gives rise to the expectation or requirement, in many domestic and international judicial settings, of judicial
decision-makers recusing themselves from cases in which they may be biased or be perceived to be biased.
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depends, of course, on a balanced initial selection of individuals, as well as on a
commitment on the part of these individuals to think and act impartially.
Informational impartiality
A third dimension of impartiality includes what I call ‘informational impartiality,’ or the
impartiality of informational inputs. Although information may be presented as objective, recent
scholarship has highlighted the ways in which such inputs may embed biases or preferences in
unnoticed ways. This can affect both a restructuring outcome and also the final assessment/opinion
of its success. Such informational inputs might include the following:
 Indicators: Indicators constitute one central informational input into any sovereign debt
restructuring, and the UNCTAD Working Group has already paid special attention to the
economic and legal aspects of the use of indicators in a DWM. 41 The principle of
impartiality further strengthens the need for ensuring the validity of such indicators and of
the situations in which they are used.
 Economic Models: Social science models, and especially economic models, that predict the
likely outcomes of restructurings and related domestic measures (i.e. in terms of GDP
growth, social costs, and other metrics) feature importantly in any sovereign debt decision.
They may be used by debtors, creditors, and other decision-makers to determine the ex ante
feasibility of a particular restructuring plan, and in particular to determine the extent of
relief necessary to return a debtor to sustainability.
o Although such models are no doubt presented in good faith, they may fail to
accurately characterize the situation. This could result in a systematic bias that
favors one or another group in a debt crisis, even when relevant actors and
institutions aim for independence and objectivity in their assessments. 42 The
question of which models and methodologies are appropriate, and of who should
make this selection, can thus be quite controversial.
o The consideration of particular models is beyond the scope of this background paper.
However, care should be taken to ensure, to the extent possible, that the selection
and use of social science models reflects an understanding of their distributional
ramifications and potential political character.43 Soliciting broad feedback on these
informational inputs might be appropriate to enhance DWM impartiality.44
41

Michael Riegner, “Legal frameworks and general principles for indicators in sovereign debt restructuring,”
UNCTAD Working Group Paper (2014); Jasper Lukkezen and Hugo Romagossa, “Early warning indicators in a debt
restructuring mechanism,” UNCTAD Working Group Paper (2014).
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In the first days of 2013, IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard co-published a working paper (interpreted as a mea
culpa) suggesting the organization had misjudged and underestimated the negative effect of austerity measures on
growth in European countries during the crisis. See Olivier Blanchard and Daniel Leigh, “Growth Forecast Errors and
Fiscal Multipliers,” IMF Working Paper No. 13/1, 3 January 2013; Howard Schneider, “An Amazing Mea Culpa from
the IMF’s Chief Economist on Austerity,” Washington Post online, 3 January 2013.
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This insight is central to the discipline of international political economy. For volumes emphasizing the contingent
and politically conditioned nature of economic models, see Jonathan Kirshner, ed., Monetary Orders: Ambiguous
Economics, Ubiquitous Politics (Cornell University Press, 2003); Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons, eds.,
Constructing the International Economy (Cornell University Press, 2010).
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This of course implicates the impartiality and appropriateness of the sources of any such inputs, including the
institutions and individuals whose expert opinions are relied upon by restructuring participants. The raises questions
about the use of experts (and possibly expert testimony) in a DWM, linking to concerns about ‘battles of the experts’ in
domestic dispute resolution procedures. While such questions may be worthy of future consideration, they are beyond
the scope of this paper.
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Note on possible tension between impartiality and accountability
As suggested above, a key mechanism for promoting impartiality in any decision-making setting is
to ensure the independence of both the individual actors making the decisions as well as the
institutional settings in which the decisions are made. It is important to point out, however, that
this might be seen as in tension with the general goal of accountability of decision-makers, which
at least in some approaches requires that they answer to and perhaps be controlled by broad
constituencies. It also may run into pragmatic problems, in particular the power of key actors and
creditors and their possible resistance to impartial institutions.
C. OVERVIEW OF PAST DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS
Although some parties will be convinced by conceptual arguments about legitimacy and
impartiality, the views of many stakeholders will likely be framed through their own concrete
experiences of sovereign debt restructuring, or their interpretations of how previous restructurings
have unfolded. As such, this section will briefly consider the institutional and historical
background of debt restructuring in light of the principles of legitimacy and impartiality. While a
comprehensive overview is beyond the scope of this paper, some attention to the perceived
problems and successes of previous moments can deepen an understanding of the political and
economic context of current discussions of a potential DWM.45
Although the predicament of unsustainable sovereign debt has existed as long as sovereigns have
borrowed, perhaps the modern era of debt restructuring dates from the debt crises of the 1980s.
These restructurings saw the concretization of institutional features developed in the preceding
decades (including the interactions of the Paris Club and especially the London Club) and also
witnessed the rise to prominence of the IFIs, particularly the IMF. The processes that have
emerged since then, when aggregated, provide the foundations for the informal and fragmented
debt workout mechanism that exists today. This section looks at several key institutions in light of
concerns about legitimacy and impartiality, and then briefly turns to several episodes and events in
debt restructuring for further illustration.
C.1. Key Players
While there are a large number of institutional players involved in sovereign debt issues, several
deserve special attention in discussing questions of legitimacy and impartiality. This section pays
particular attention to the roles of the Paris and London Clubs and the IMF.
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Elements of the discussion here are drawn from Odette Lienau, Rethinking Sovereign Debt: Politics, Reputation, and
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The Paris Club of Bilateral Official Creditors
One core institutional player in the informal debt workout mechanism has been the Paris Club.
Founded by creditor governments in 1956, it addresses the debt owed by sovereign borrowers’ to
official bilateral creditors at regularly scheduled meetings at the French Treasury.46 Although its
centrality has waned somewhat in the last decade, in part due to more comprehensive efforts at
bilateral debt relief, it has featured prominently in the contemporary history of debt restructurings
and remains an important player today. The rise of emerging market official creditors also
suggests that bilateral credit issues will remain a feature in sovereign debt going forward, and
indeed the Paris Club has recently reached out to emerging market lenders in an effort to
harmonize approaches to sovereign lending.47
The Paris Club has no legal/institutional personality and no written charter and, perhaps in line
with this relative informality, it has not sought source legitimacy by soliciting the opinions of other
stakeholders in establishing its basic negotiating mechanisms. Although it aims to work in the
public interest, and likely falls under the IPA and GAL understandings of public authority and
global administration, it is to an important degree driven by the particular political goals of its
members. On the process legitimacy front, consensus among Paris Club participants is required for
agreement, thus ensuring that its members have their voices fully heard.48 Setting aside the power
dynamics that might exist between Paris Club members, this high level of representation goes
beyond the majority or supermajority standard that might reasonably be required for state consent.
However, there has been concern expressed that not all those impacted by Paris Club decisions
have an equal voice in the negotiations. In addition to the Paris Club creditors, non-Paris Club
official creditors implicated in a particular country case may be invited to join as well. The IMF,
World Bank, UNCTAD, and other official international and regional institutions have observer
status, and debtors must already have agreed to an IMF-approved program before entering into
negotiations with the Paris Club.49 Civil society actors and private creditors have generally been
excluded from negotiations. Nonetheless, Paris Club agreements have contained comparability of
treatment clauses that effectively prevent debtors from offering better terms to other creditors
(including both private and non-Paris Club public lenders) than those obtained by Paris Club
members. Particularly beginning in the 1990s, this has generated dissatisfaction among private
sector creditors, some of whom have resented that Club decisions may affect their investments
without incorporating their input. Perhaps in part as a result of this exclusion, debtors have
sometimes had difficulty securing the agreement of private creditors to the Paris Club-established
46

For more on the Paris Club, see, among others, Martin A. Weiss, “The Paris Club and International Debt Relief,”
Congressional Research Service (U.S. GPO October 2013). For a consideration of the uniquely political character of
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The Paris Club,” UNCTAD Discussion Papers No. 192 (Nov. 2008).
48
This is one of the five key principles of Paris Club negotiations. Available at
http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/composition/principles/cinq-grands-principes. Of course, the general power
dynamics that apply among the members outside of the Paris Club context likely translate into this setting as well.
49
UNCTAD is unique among the international economic organizations, in part because it is not a creditor to sovereign
borrowers. It has participated in over 260 debt rescheduling for over 60 countries since 1978, often providing technical
support to debtor countries preparing for and participating in Paris Club negotiations. This assistance is offered in
accordance with resolutions 165 (S-IX) and 222 (XXI) of UNCTAD’s Trade and Development Board.

18

terms. 50 Also relevant to process legitimacy, the Paris Club has historically resisted calls for
increased transparency, only beginning to publicly post the basic contours of negotiated
agreements in 2003.51 It does not have written rules, though it aims to work according to stated
principles and makes reference to precedent, and may be fairly flexible across different country
cases.52 The virtue of the Paris Club is its ability to act relatively quickly, at least once an IMF
package is in place. It also is able to achieve significant debt relief when motivated, through both
the official bilateral agreements and the leverage offered by the principle of comparable treatment.
The London Club of Commercial Bank Creditors
Although international capital flows in the initial post-World War II era moved largely through
public creditors, private lenders returned to the global arena en masse in the 1970s. Initially this
private capital moved through commercial banks, whose enthusiastic lending practices through the
1970s resulted in their being deeply implicated in the 1980s debt crisis.53 To coordinate a response
to debtor payment problems that emerged, these private banks established ad hoc processes to
negotiate jointly this debt, and as a group came to be called the London Club. The importance of
these negotiations has diminished with the move away from commercial bank lending. However,
the London Club may still be relevant for certain restructurings, and the memory of London Club
restructurings (particularly those of the 1980s, discussed below) may impact current views.
The London Club’s meetings and associated processes are even more ad hoc than those of the Paris
Club. There is no institutional base or regular meeting location, and any particular instantiation of
the London Club is dissolved at the conclusion of a restructuring. There are no written rules and
there may be significant flexibility across different country cases, though bank participants have
historically been keenly aware of (and concerned about) setting precedents for future restructuring
terms. A London Club meeting is generally convened when a sovereign debtor contacts its major
commercial bank creditors seeking to negotiate. These key banks then establish a Bank Advisory
Committee (BAC, or creditors’ committee), which undertakes negotiations toward a broadly
acceptable agreement. These agreements might include the extension of debt maturities, provision
of new lending, and/or reduction of the face value of the debt. Once an agreement is reached
between the BAC and a sovereign debtor, the lead banks present the agreement to other implicated
banks, who must then agree to the outcome to finalize a debt restructuring. Relative to the current
system of bond restructuring, the London Club process appears relatively coherent. This is not to
say that unanimity existed among member banks; indeed, disagreements and holdouts remained
common.54 However, the London Club process in its heyday generally did not include banks who
became creditors with the intention of holding out for preferential treatment, as we see with
vulture/distressed debt funds today. In addition, internal disciplining mechanisms within the
commercial bank group, including carrots and sticks, were available. Eventually, these helped to
50

Jürgen Kaiser, “Resolving Sovereign Debt Crises: Towards a Fair and Transparent International Insolvency
Framework,” Global Policy and Development Study, October 2013, 13.
51
These basics are provided at the Paris Club website, www.clubdeparis.org. The agreed minutes, which constitute the
basis for binding bilateral agreements between the debtor and particular official creditors, remain unavailable.
52
Given that political considerations may play a part in the determination of appropriate solutions, the goal of
consistency is sometimes set aside. The restructuring of Iraq’s debt after the fall of Saddam Hussein offers a case in
point. For more on this, see Lienau, Rethinking Sovereign Debt, n. 45, 210-215.
53
For an overview of trends in lending , and in particular the increased integration of lending (and then debt
restructuring) frameworks, see Lienau, Rethinking Sovereign Debt, n. 45, 154-171.
54
Das, Papaioannou, and Trebesch, n. 45, 17; Bruno, n. 45, 185.

19

ensure fairly broad creditor participation, even if certain creditors objected to these processes as
unfair and unrepresentative of their interests. BAC efforts were supported by major public actors,
including the finance ministries of the largest creditor countries, who were concerned with the
systemic implications of a failed restructuring (again in contrast to the less systemically relevant
funds that constitute current holdout creditors).
The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Multilateral creditors, such as the IMF and the World Bank, have also been essential to debt
restructuring over the last several decades. The IMF in particular has been central in addressing
the external payment and debt problems of its members. Initially established to support the golddollar standard of the Bretton Woods monetary regime, which was abandoned in the early 1970s, it
has multiple overlapping mandates, including the broad maintenance of global financial stability.55
As part of this, the IMF has emerged to play multiple roles relevant to debt workouts. In particular,
it engages in interrelated programs of surveillance, technical assistance, and conditional financial
assistance, all of which may be brought to bear in sovereign debt. To begin with, the IMF has
developed considerable expertise on a range of financial and economic matters, enabling it to
provide policy advice and technical assistance to countries. Accepting this policy advice (after
negotiations) may be effectively mandatory for certain debt restructurings, such as through the
general requirement that an IMF-approved program is agreed upon before states receive Paris Club
debt relief. This has been a central feature of the HIPC and MDRI programs, which provide public
creditor debt relief to low-income countries. Once a restructuring has been agreed upon, the IMF
may also monitor the debtor to ensure that the conditions of the agreement are met. This programspecific monitoring complements the more general surveillance function that the IMF plays within
global finance. Finally, the IMF can become a lender in its own right as part of conditional crisis
financing. This lending may be organized conjunction with a broader restructuring agreement and
coordinated with private creditors.
Although IMF governance structures mean that the largest global economies have the strongest
voice on its executive board, the IMF is legally accountable to its 188 member countries. While
the IMF Board of Governors (through which state members are represented) votes on major issues,
in practice IMF policy is directed largely by the Executive Board. Historically, the Board has been
relatively resistant to process legitimacy concerns and to receiving input on specific issues from its
member states and especially from civil society actors. However, since the turn of the millennium
and particularly within the last decade the IMF has become more politically aware and more
concerned about perceptions of its own representativeness, impartiality, and legitimacy. For
example, it has progressively committed itself to the ideal of transparency, introducing in 2009 a
‘Transparency Principle’ indicating that the Fund will “strive to disclose documents and
information on a timely basis unless strong and specific reasons argue against such disclosure,” and
following up with regular reviews of its transparency policy.56
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This new openness, the multiple roles played by the IMF, and its concern for global financial
stability means that the Fund is uniquely well situated to take a global view on the international
financial architecture and the role of sovereign debt restructuring within it. It is hardly surprising
that the much-discussed SDRM proposal of 2003 originated within the IMF. Nonetheless, there
may be some concern that the Fund’s multiple roles mean that it could be subject to internal
conflicts of interest. Such conflicts could compromise the degree to which it is able to act in an
impartial and independent manner in a debt restructuring context, and also may compromise (and
indeed has compromised) perceptions of its impartiality in sovereign debt situations. These
criticisms are made more pressing by the practice of IMF conditionality, i.e. the requirement that
sovereign debtors undertake a series of (sometimes controversial) policy reforms as part of the
condition for lending.57
In addition, the IMF’s broad mandate of supporting global financial stability has sometimes
required it to be especially attentive to the systemic importance (and fragility) of major
international banks. Their collapse under the pressure of sovereign debt crises could well
undermine global financial and economic well-being as a whole—perhaps more so than the
continued underperformance of a given debtor state. As such, IMF attentiveness to bank concerns
may be sensical in light of this general mandate. However, this orientation is arguably in tension
with the features of impartiality and fair burden-sharing that would characterize a maximally
legitimate DWM.
C.2. Periods in Sovereign Debt Restructuring
The institutional underpinnings of sovereign restructuring have remained relatively constant for
several decades, involving the presence of the three key players just discussed. Still, distinct
periods can be identified, each of which has likely shaped the perspectives of stakeholders.
1980s Debt Crisis and Bank Negotiations
Sovereign debt restructuring through the 1980s debt crisis centered on the London Club
mechanism discussed above, as commercial banks constituted the major creditors of the period.
Falling export commodity prices and the US Federal Reserve decision to sextuple interest rates
(from 3% to 20%) precipitated Mexico’s 1982 announcement of its inability to continue debt
servicing, followed soon after by similar announcements from other states in Latin America and
elsewhere. BACs responded by agreeing to reschedule loan payments and to provide bridge loans
to sovereign debtors, effectively treating the crisis as a temporary (if lingering) liquidity problem.
This allowed countries to continue interest payments and also allowed banks to avoid declaring the
loans to be non-performing. This approach helped to forestall banking crises in major Northern
countries, given that the exposure of major banks to Latin American debt in some cases exceeded
these banks’ entire capital.58
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However, this proved to be insufficient relief for debtor countries themselves, many of whom had
to return to the London Club for serial rescheduling. The relatively harmonized creditor approach
of the 1980s thus did not correlate with positive debtor outcomes, and perhaps offers a cautionary
note against too heavy an emphasis on creditor coordination problems. In the 1980s such
coordination allowed for an oligopoly of sorts, in which banks were collectively able to demand
terms that sovereign debtors may have considered objectionable.59 Furthermore, the treatment of
all bank debts through a single process made it effectively impossible to challenge those debt
contracts that arguably violated substantive principles of equity or incipient principles of
responsible sovereign lending.60 But in the absence of alternative capital sources, there was little
option but to accede to these demands.
The IMF interaction with private banks and sovereign debtors through much of the 1980s only
aggravated perceptions in the global South of a partial system biased toward creditors. BACs
required debtors to agree to IMF adjustment programs as part of rescheduling agreements, and
throughout the 1980s the IMF did not lend into arrears—that is, the Fund refused to extend loans to
sovereign debtors with outstanding payments due to private creditors. Although banks too had to
agree to the negotiated terms for IMF participation, this Fund policy placed considerable pressure
on debtors and arguably granted additional leverage to banks, leading to charges that the IMF was
serving as a “debt collector” for private banks.61 As the decade drew to a close, public actors
including the IMF and the U.S. Treasury eventually assumed a greater role in bringing the debt
crisis to an end, in part due to frustration with the recalcitrance of some banks.62 Most importantly,
US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady announced a plan to securitize the sovereign debt,
converting bank loans into freely tradable bonds (commonly called Brady bonds). This allowed
commercial banks to exit the debt market, after accepting a write-off on the original face value of
the debt, and launched a new period of disintermediated sovereign lending, i.e. sovereign loan
obligations connecting the investor directly to the sovereign state without the intermediary of
commercial banks.
1990s Bail-Outs and the Return of Bonds
The Brady bond plan was widely hailed as a success, and private investors enthusiastically returned
to sovereign debt markets, with many assuming that the bonds themselves—unlike previous bank
loans—were “inviolable.”63 Payment on these bonds was in fact ensured through much of the
1990s, though not necessarily by the debt sustainability of the sovereign borrowers themselves.
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When Mexico’s financial turmoil in 1994 raised the specter of default, which some feared could
have systemic affects paralleling the 1980s debt crisis, the U.S. Treasury and the IMF stepped in
with up to $50 billion of financing. This swift and significant attention by major public actors,
including the direct lending of public funds, allowed Mexico to continue payment on its bond debt,
constituting a significant shift from 1980s practices.
This public sector involvement in Mexico created a template for similar actions in Thailand,
Indonesia, and South Korea following the Asian financial crisis and financial problems in Brazil
and Russia. In each of these cases, with the exception of Russia, official sector bail-outs of
sovereign debtors allowed them to remain current on their debt to private creditors and so maintain
their engagement with international capital markets. As such, the 1990s bail-outs benefited the
bondholders just as they did sovereign borrowers. Furthermore, as a condition of IMF involvement,
sovereign debtors accepting these rescue packages undertook a series of policy reforms, generally
involving significant deregulation and privatization of key economic sectors and the curtailing of
public expenditures (including on subsidies and social welfare programs)—the so-called
Washington Consensus. Such programs tended to be unpopular within these countries, where
some felt that the IMF in particular (the target of much ire) had placed the entire burden of
financial crisis adjustment on debtor state populations while expecting that private creditors would
be paid in full. Such feelings were aggravated by the expectation, in some cases, that sovereign
states also take responsibility for the debt of private domestic banks that owed significant amounts
to international investors.
2000s Bond Restructurings and the Rise of the Holdout Problem
Though official sector bailouts have of course continued to play a central role in debt crises, the era
of near-continuous bailouts to ensure uninterrupted service of privately held debt ended in 2000
with the restructuring of Ecuador’s Brady bonds.64 Restructurings covering sovereign bonds issued
by Pakistan, Ukraine, Uruguay and others followed shortly thereafter, with each adding to the
available techniques for sovereign bond restructurings. When the proposal for a sovereign debt
restructuring mechanism put forth by Ann Krueger in 2001-2002 failed to make headway, 65
practitioners and policy makers dealing with sovereign debt intensified their efforts to promote the
use of Collective Action Clauses (CACs), which allowed a sovereign debt restructuring to bind all
creditors so long as it received a threshold level of support. These became more common in bonds
issued by major emerging market economies in the U.S., and have also been required in bonds
issued by Eurozone countries since January 2013. Official sector support has remained central in
certain cases, with IMF bail-outs organized in Argentina, Brazil, Seychelles, Iceland, Hungary, and
Ukraine since 2000. Such official sector involvement has played a major role in the European
sovereign debt crisis, featuring in the Greek restructuring and in the IMF-EU loan agreements with
Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus.66 Again, however, this reliance on official sector liquidity support
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has been subject to criticism, for (among other things) incentivizing short-term lending, risking
public funds, and delaying needed reforms.67
Parallel to these developments, and suggesting the insufficiency of purely contractual debt
resolution mechanisms, has been the full emergence of the holdout creditor problem in bond
restructurings. In the 1999 case of Elliott Associates v. Banco de la Nacion (Peru), Elliot obtained
a judgment that entitled it to full principal payment plus interest, along with an attachment order
against Peru’s US-based property used for commercial activities.68 Peru ultimately chose to settle
rather than risk any interference with its Brady bond payments. The more recent case involving
Argentina and NML Capital (also owned by Elliot Management), denied certiorari by the US
Supreme Court, may prove more intractable. The Second Circuit decision entitles Elliott to full
payment plus interest and actually prevents Argentina’s trustee (BNY Mellon) from making
payment to restructured bondholders unless payment is also made to Elliot.69 As of writing, no
payment has been made and the final resolution of the situation remains unclear.70
To deal with the holdout problem, individual states may choose to circumscribe these investors’
access to courts in their jurisdiction, as did the UK in 2010. However, as it stands the NML
decision threatens to undermine the system of debt restructuring, such as it is, by rewarding
holdouts and disincentivizing investors from agreeing to restructurings. Although CAC’s can be
helpful in promoting orderly restructuring to some degree, they do not apply retroactively to
previously issued bonds. In addition, even those bonds with CACs rely on supermajorities within
individual bond series, so that holdout problems may remain in certain circumstances.71
C.3. A Suboptimal and Fragmented Restructuring Mechanism
The constellation of actors, institutions, and processes that has developed since the 1980s debt
crisis has constructed a patchwork sovereign debt restructuring mechanism to some degree. 72
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However, to the extent that such a system exists, it is largely incomplete, somewhat incoherent, and
suboptimal. Each sub-element of the mechanism has problems, from a legitimacy and impartiality
perspective, and the system as a whole shares these defects.
The fragmented nature of the sovereign debt arena means that each group of creditors is heavily
focused on obtaining a restructuring agreement that meets its own institutional goals and
constraints; there is no need to compromise or think more comprehensively across creditors. Once
the pieces of a debtor’s debt puzzle are put back together, the final outcome may be insufficient to
return the debtor to sustainability and to make fair payment to creditors. In addition, the principles
and procedures governing a particular sovereign state’s debt can vary, and they may also vary
across different debtor states. This undermines the predictability and stability of the sovereign debt
market, in addition to being problematic in the eyes of many debtors. The IFIs, particularly the
IMF, offer a more global view, given their explicit concern with the long-run economic
sustainability of debtor countries and the financial system as a whole. However, the multiple roles
played by the IMF, including that of a lender in its own right, arguably undermines perceptions of
its impartiality in debt workouts.
D. EXAMPLES FROM CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE
If the current, informal sovereign debt restructuring system is problematic from the point of view
of legitimacy and impartiality, how might other correlate institutions or practices fare through this
lens? While it is impossible to undertake a comprehensive review, this section looks at several
features of two relevant mechanisms to help fill in the ways in which a DWM might attempt to
meet these goals. The first part will focus on key agreed upon features of domestic insolvency/debt
restructuring institutions, primarily as interpreted through the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on
Insolvency. The second part will consider rules covering two adjudicative bodies that focus
particularly on investor-state arbitration.
D.1. Legitimacy and Impartiality for Domestic Insolvency Systems
Given certain parallels with the sovereign debt situation, it is useful to consider the degree to which
features of legitimacy and impartiality play a central role in domestic insolvency proceedings.
Although laws governing the relations between debtors and creditors, and in particular rules
addressing the collection of judgment debt, are among the most ancient, the development and study
of insolvency law as a standalone field is relatively recent.73 That said, the last decades have seen
an explosion of interest in insolvency (in particular for business organizations), with significant
attention paid at the international level to encouraging and harmonizing the rules and mechanisms
governing insolvency. Perhaps the most comprehensive and successful effort to formulate both
shared principles for insolvency and possible models for their implementation has been that
undertaken by UNCITRAL in its development of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency,
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published in 2005 (with additional sections added in 2011 and 2013).74
Legitimacy Concerns
The source legitimacy of national insolvency laws are beyond the ambit of this paper, depending
on the legitimating mechanisms within each jurisdiction. However, it is worth highlighting that the
UNCITRAL guide itself was developed on the basis of representation, through the auspices of a
working group attuned to source legitimacy concerns.75 This representation involved official state
delegations, observer state delegations, international financial institutions (especially the IMF,
World Bank, and ADB), international governance organizations (such as the OECD and
COMESA), and professional associations. Expert-based source legitimacy also derived from the
involvement of these professional associations, along with the use of experts from practice,
academia, IFIs, and other arenas in more ad hoc drafting sessions. General state consent to the
process and to the product was offered through the General Assembly Resolution 59/40,76 though
of course the actual enactment and implementation of insolvency laws exist at the national level.
Process legitimacy and procedural fairness, including a commitment to impartiality, are central to
domestic insolvency proceedings and may be understood as general principles of law applicable to
insolvency. As such, they should translate to the global/transnational level as well. This falls in
line with the emphasis on process in legal traditions of International Public Authority and Global
Administrative Law. One of the key objectives of insolvency procedures, as laid out in the
UNCITRAL Guide is to provide for a “timely, efficient and impartial resolution of insolvency.”77
The Guide further emphasizes the centrality of transparency, noting that enacted laws should
“[e]nsure a transparent and predictable insolvency law that contains incentives for gathering and
dispensing information.” 78 In every jurisdiction, debtors can voluntarily commence insolvency
proceedings, encouraging ownership of the proceedings, although some jurisdictions require an
eligibility determination before the insolvency proceeding technically begins and applicable
standstill mechanisms are put in place.79 Domestic insolvency proceedings involve fair process
and a right to be heard for creditors whose claims will be determined and possibly curtailed. Given
the large number of creditors involved in some insolvency proceedings, many national jurisdictions
contemplate the use of creditor committees as a mode of participation. However, the UNCITRAL
Guide notes that steps should be taken to ensure that such committees are truly representative and
impartial as to the interests of its members, for example by disallowing the appointment of unduly
partial creditors to a committee.80
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Perhaps the most distinctive feature of insolvency law is its recognition of a debtor’s inability to
pay creditors as a group—as opposed to an unwillingness or inability to pay a particular creditor—
and therefore its commitment to dealing with this unsustainable debt on a collective basis. This
collective element means that to an important degree creditors may be in tension with one another
in insolvency proceedings, rather than only with the debtor.81 But it also draws impetus from the
determination that, as a whole, creditors will gain from cooperation, as compared to the situation in
which each seeks payment for itself but risks the prospect of complete non-payment in the event of
coming late to the game. As such, comprehensiveness is central to insolvency proceedings at the
domestic level. The participation of creditors is not voluntary, at least to the extent they intend to
make any claim against the debtor after the commencement of an insolvency proceeding. This fact
ensures full participation, and also is accompanied by procedures that allow for the full
participation of creditors or creditor groups, such as the creditor committees mentioned above. In
the words of Rosalind Mason, “insolvency law features the notion of collective impartiality… there
is a moratorium on creditor action and proceedings and a consolidation of the conduct of litigation.
Individual claims are addressed through the collective administration, which balances the disparate
interests of the various parties.”82
In terms of outcome, the UNCITRAL Guide, as well as most national insolvency procedures, set a
baseline of acceptable creditor recovery. The first key objective of the Guide, namely achieving a
balance between liquidation and reorganization, includes the provision that in any restructuring
“creditors would not involuntarily receive less than in liquidation.”83 Given the non-applicability
of financially liquidating a sovereign state, this is difficult to translate. However, it relates to the
general requirement that creditors be treated in good faith, and that they not be required to take a
greater discount than is necessary for the debtor’s recovery. On the debtor side, as a general matter,
restructuring plans in insolvency proceedings should not be agreed to or confirmed (to the extent
that court confirmation is required) unless they are likely to actually rehabilitate the debtor in
question.84 Thus a restructuring plan considered to be “too little” for the debtor problems at issue
would not be considered outcome-legitimate, and therefore likely should not be confirmed or
agreed to under general insolvency principles.
Many states have ratified the major human rights conventions, and thus they are likely applicable
to domestic insolvency laws in those cases, and might be considered an element of outcome
legitimacy (as well as binding international law). The UNCITRAL Guide notes that in determining
which assets might be excluded from eventual distribution to creditors in the case of a natural
person debtor, “consideration might need to be given to applicable human rights obligations,
including international treaty obligations, which are intended to protect the debtor and relevant
family members and may affect the exclusions that should be made,” in order to “allow for the
minimum necessary to preserve the personal rights of the debtor and allow the debtor to lead a
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productive life.” 85 The more general implication could be that such human rights should be
protected regardless of how natural persons are situated in an insolvency (i.e. whether as debtors
themselves or as those impacted by another debtor’s—including a sovereign state debtor’s—
restructuring).86
Impartiality
As noted above, process legitimacy, with its implication of impartiality, is a core feature of
domestic insolvency proceedings. Impartiality may also be considered central to insolvency
proceedings at the domestic level in its own right.
In terms of institutional impartiality, there is considerable variation among states in the institutional
settings for insolvency proceedings. For example, certain civil law countries (such as France)
mandate significant court involvement for any major decision. At the other end of the spectrum,
Australia advocates that debtors dealing with insolvency avoid court oversight to the extent
possible. The UNCITRAL Guide remains neutral, not requiring court involvement in every
instance. However, it does specify that “competent and independent” courts are available, at least
as a background measure.
More focus is placed on actor impartiality. Given that the UNCTRAL Guide focuses on individual
or organizational insolvency, it contemplates (but does not mandate) the appointment of an
“insolvency representative” (such as a trustee, administrator, judicial manager, etc.) to administer
the bankruptcy proceedings. Any such individual must not only be knowledgeable but also have
the attributes of “integrity, impartiality, and independence.”87 The Guide recommends that any
insolvency law “require the disclosure of a conflict of interest, a lack of independence or
circumstances that may lead to a conflict of interest or lack of independence” and also that this
obligation “continue throughout the insolvency proceedings.”88
D.2. Efforts Toward Impartiality and Legitimacy in Investor Treaty Arbitration
Additional support can be found for attending to characteristics that aim to support legitimacy and
impartiality in the area of investor treaty arbitration. Such arbitration, which may be incorporated
into hard law instruments (such as Bilateral Investment Treaties or concession contracts), directly
involves sovereign states and investors. By its nature such arbitration is ad hoc and oriented
toward the agreement of the specific parties to a dispute (rather than toward general fairness,
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coherent law, or particular outcomes). Indeed, considerable concern has been expressed about
inconsistency across arbitral tribunals and decisions, given the lack of precedent: “Parallel
tribunals can give rise to awards with inconsistent conclusions, and which may even be
scandalously contradictory.”89 Even more troubling charges have been made that such arbitration
may be systematically biased in favor of investor claimants. 90 Nonetheless, certain procedural
rules in these arbitrations still offer some insight into how process legitimacy and impartiality are
broadly acknowledged to be essential goals—even in this controversial arena and even when not
fully achieved. Two sets of rules commonly used, and referred to in this section, are the ICSID
Rules and the UNCITRAL Rules.
Impartiality
In terms of institutional impartiality, one of the central purported benefits of arbitration is precisely
that parties have a greater degree of control over the proceedings than in a conventional judicial
dispute resolution setting. As such, by design, there is a lower degree of institutional independence
in both the ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules than in standard domestic court settings. The parties pay
the arbitrators directly and have significant control over the arbitral location.91
The primary safeguard of impartiality in this setting, then, is supposed to be through attentiveness
to actor impartiality, and in particular through the selection of arbitrators themselves. ICSID Rule
6(2) requires that all arbitrators sign a declaration of independence in advance of the first session
that lists any factors that might compromise their impartiality.92 In addition, ICSID Convention
Article 39 specifies that the majority of arbitrators be citizens of states other than the claimantinvestor’s home state and the respondent state. Similarly, in the event that the parties are unable to
arrange a panel independently, arbitrators appointed by the Chairman of ICSID’s Administrative
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Council must not be nationals of either the state party or the home state of the claimant-investor.93
Finally, the default procedures for ICSID involve a three-person tribunal, with each party
appointing one arbitrator and then agreeing on a third, who serves as the panel’s president.94
The basic orientation is very similar under the UNCITRAL Rules. Both prospective and appointed
arbitrators for UNCITRAL must disclose circumstances that may raise justifiable doubts as to
impartiality or independence, with the 2010 changes to the rules clarifying that this duty is ongoing
and continues until issuance of the final award. 95 UNCITRAL does not specify nationality
requirements for arbitrators, but does mandate that that appointing authority consider “the
advisability of appointing an arbitrator of a nationality other than the nationalities of the parties.”96
The UNCITRAL Rules also presume (but do not mandate) that three individuals will be appointed
to the arbitration panel. Each party appoints one arbitrator, and then the two initial appointees
consult and jointly select a third.97
Charges have been made that even these procedures fall short and that problems are more
endemic. 98 Concern has also been expressed that, in any case, such processes have not been
sufficiently followed to rid investor state dispute settlement of bias and the perception of bias.99
However, the desirability of impartiality as a goal or guiding principle is hardly in question.
Legitimacy
The ownership element of legitimacy is well respected in arbitration, as suggested in the discussion
of impartiality above. Given the limited number of parties generally involved, equal participation
of these parties is less of a problem than it might be in other, larger settings. A series of
amendments to the ICSID Rules in 2006 aimed to improve the transparency and participatory
element of proceedings for non-parties. In particular, Rule 37 makes possible submissions by
“non-disputing parties” through amici curiae, Rule 32 covers the possibility of making hearings
open to the public, and Rule 48 governs the publication of awards.100
In regards to efficiency, ICSID Rules specify that a tribunal should be constituted “as soon as
possible” and “with all possible dispatch” after an arbitration is requested, with a series of time
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frames for arbitrator appointments.101 The UNCITRAL Rules similarly specify a series of time
frames for constituting the tribunal and appointing arbitrators, specifying that the appointing
authority is required to make the appointment “as promptly as possible.”102 However, under both
processes there is the possibility or opportunity of manipulation and delay by the parties,
particularly through the process of appointing (and objecting to) arbitrators. As such, the process
ownership and consent elements of investment treaty arbitration may undermine, to some degree,
efficiency.103
D.3. Guiding Principles of Law
One final question is the degree to which the principles and practices embedded in, or at least
sought after, in these other mechanisms may be understood as embodying emerging customary
international law or as demonstrating general principles of law.
As noted in the conceptual discussion above, legitimacy can be understood as a composite
principle, made up of a number of procedural and substantive norms. Similarly, impartiality is an
ideal that itself sub-divides, and supplements multiple other key principles. The content of both of
these ideals is perhaps too multi-faceted and variable to provide the specificity of a principle of
customary international law or a general principle of law in their own right. 104 However,
legitimacy and impartiality can be understood as guiding principles in international law, which help
to orient the formulation of more specific rules and decision-making procedures. Their nearuniversal desirability is demonstrated in both domestic insolvency procedures and in the arbitration
procedures briefly discussed here.
E. APPLICABILITY OF LEGITIMACY AND IMPARTIALITY TO A DWM
This final section will consider how a future DWM might instantiate the principles of legitimacy
and impartiality. It offers preliminary recommendations for discussion based in part on current
practices in other areas and in part on concerns about previous episodes in debt restructuring. It
will briefly assess several debt restructuring proposals in light of these themes. It will also note
several obstacles to meeting the goals of legitimacy and impartiality in a DWM, asking whether the
negative effects of such impediments might be mitigated.
E.1. Preliminary Recommendations
In light of the preceding discussion, some preliminary recommendations can be made relevant to
enhancing the legitimacy and impartiality of any DWM. Note that these recommendations are
relevant regardless of the particular form a DWM takes. Furthermore, they are presented as
ideals/goals, with the understanding that in some situations compromises would have to be made
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in light of more pragmatic considerations of political feasibility, timeliness, and cost effectiveness.
Recommendations Relevant to the Establishment of a DWM
(Source Legitimacy)
State Consent: Given the continuing viability of state consent as a source of legitimacy in
international affairs, due regard should be given to maximizing the support for a DWM across as
broad a range of states as possible.
 This is the case whether a DWM emerges as a treaty-based international organization,
through ad hoc tribunals, or as soft law principles governing private mechanisms.
 One question here may be the degree to which other facets of legitimacy – such as
particular procedural safeguards including transparency or a commitment to particular
substantive outcomes – may have to be balanced against the goal of broad state consent.
Participation: In establishing a DWM and determining its rules, a good faith effort should be
made to identify and involve an appropriately broad array of stakeholders through meaningful
participatory mechanisms.
 These may involve state groups, creditor groups, IFIs, NGOs, special rapporteurs and other
appointed representatives, and other interested parties.
 Democratic legitimation is likely not sufficiently broadly accepted to feature in the
establishment of a DWM. However, general attentiveness to the voices of individuals and
sub-state groups (rather than exclusively those of states), may offer a subsidiary element of
democratic legitimacy to a DWM.
Expertise: In establishing a DWM, it may be helpful to consult with those considered particularly
expert in relevant fields.
 A relatively unified opinion from expert groups could be valuable in establishing DWM
legitimacy on this front.
Recommendations for Ongoing DWM Processes
(Process Legitimacy)
Ongoing Participation: The working processes of any DWM should ensure that affected parties
have a chance to be heard before decisions are made. They should also ideally involve those
parties in the decision-making process, for example through appropriate majority or super-majority
voting procedures.
 Depending on the size and complexity of the restructuring, this participation might work
through representative structures such as committees or class/stakeholder groups. To the
extent that committees are utilized, care should be taken to ensure that there is fair
representation within the committee structure. As part of this, there should be substantial
similarity within committees or stakeholder groups, and DWM decision-makers should
consider placing significantly different parties in separate groups/committees.
 An opportunity should be heard on, among other issues, possible restructuring plans and the
allowance/disallowance of debt claims.
 Participation should be supported by notice and comment procedures, claim processes akin
to those used in domestic insolvency law, or similar procedures.
 A DWM should be open to participation from civil society actors including NGOs acting as
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observers and amici curiae.
Due care should be taken to balance the goal of broad participation with the exigencies of
crisis management, should this be relevant for a particular restructuring.105

Ownership: DWM processes should be especially attentive to the concerns of the sovereign state
involved in restructuring to promote country ownership of the final outcome.
 In order to begin a restructuring process through the DWM, the debtor state must submit a
formal request. Only voluntary proceedings should be permitted.
 Special attention should be paid to involving institutions and groups within the restructuring
state in the DWM process. These might include different governmental branches and
agencies, as well as major civil society groups and perhaps important opposition parties.
Comprehensiveness/Full Participation: To the extent possible, a DWM should aim to engage the
full array of creditors and stakeholders in any restructuring.
 Procedures designed to enhance creditor participation, including the use of representative
committees, should be promoted.
 All participants should be bound by the final outcome so long as they meet threshold voting
requirements (for example, a super-majority of creditors in a particular group).
 To the extent that any stakeholders are excluded from DWM decision-making or voting
procedures, due regard should be given to their claims in formulating any restructuring plan
or sustainability analysis, and procedures should be available to ensure their voices are
heard.
 Stakeholders/creditors who are eligible for the DWM process but who elect not to
participate should nonetheless have their claims bound by the process to the extent
possible/enforceable under the DWM framework, so long as other key elements of
legitimacy and impartiality are present.
Transparency: DWM processes should be as transparent as possible. Any deviations should be
exceptional and necessary for the public good, and should be permitted only to the extent required
to meet important policy goals, such as successful crisis management.
 Transparency and publicity should apply to procedural/logistical information on the
restructuring (key dates, deadlines, etc.) and to substantive outcomes/decisions.
 Information should be easily accessible at a global level, with due care paid to variations in
the technological capacity of different audiences.
 Sovereign borrowers should seek to be transparent to external and internal audiences on
issues related to sovereign debt, in line with UNCTAD Principles 10 and 11.
Reasoned Decisions: Any DWM should require all parties, and particularly any third-party
decision makers, to provide reasons for their decisions.
 Reasons should include the analytical and informational/evidentiary foundations
underpinning final outcomes.
 Parties/stakeholders (including the debtor and creditors) should provide the reasons
underpinning their own positions as well.
Efficiency: Restructuring under the DWM should be conducted in as efficient a manner as possible.
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This is in line with UNCTAD Principle 15, which requires prompt, efficient, and fair
rearrangements, and with UNCTAD Principle 7, which notes that creditors “should seek a speedy
and orderly resolution to the problem.”
 Time frames should be specified for the making of an eligibility determination, for the
appointment of arbitrators or core key players, for the formulation of a restructuring plan,
and other key procedural steps.
 Deadlines should be provided for any notice and comment procedures and the submission
of debt claims.
 Time frames/deadlines may need to be calibrated to the size/complexity of a particular
restructuring.
Appropriate reasons should be given for diverging from preset/recommended time frames.
 Attention should be paid to the possibility that efficiency may be somewhat in tension with
the goal of broad and deep participation. Due regard should be given to balancing these
goals, and the development of participatory mechanisms should be attentive to efficiency
concerns.
Review: The possibility of review by an external body of procedures of or decisions arising from a
DWM could be considered.
 This may be limited to particular subject matters over which the reviewing institution has
jurisdiction or expertise.
Recommendations on DWM Outcomes
(Outcome Legitimacy)
Sustainable Economic Outcomes: Restructurings under the DWM should comprehensively address
the underlying debt problem in order to avoid the need for disruptive serial restructurings.
 This depends in part upon the careful determination, ex ante, of long-term debt
sustainability. Parties and other DWM decision-makers should clarify the evidentiary basis
for these determinations, and use caution and balance in employing indicators and
economic models.
 To the extent that debt restructuring plans contemplate or depend upon significant domestic
adjustment, this fact should be made clear in advance to all stakeholders.
 To the extent that domestic legislation (or other contingent action) is required for the
success of the restructuring plan, sovereign debtors should be encouraged to undertake such
measures in advance of the final DWM agreement (even if the entry into force of relevant
domestic legislation is conditioned upon the restructuring agreement itself).
 Agreements under a DWM might consider the use of techniques that allow for some
flexibility in payment amounts ex post (such as GDP-indexed bonds and contingentconvertible (CoCo) bonds).106 The use of CACs, including aggregated CACs, may also be
helpful in limiting the need for a return to the DWM.
Acceptable Creditor Outcomes: To ensure that the outcome of a debt restructuring is acceptable
and fair to creditors, modifications to the debt burden must be proportional to the need of the
debtor.
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The burden of adjustment should be shared across stakeholders, including by the citizens of
the restructuring state as well as creditors.
To the extent relevant, seniority/priority and security interests that are enforceable outside
of the DWM process should be respected within the DWM.
Asset recovery could relieve the need for and size of creditor losses, and can be understood
as a substantive goal in its own right.

Capital Access: To enable the sovereign debtor to return to reasonably-priced capital market
access in a timely fashion, agreements under a DWM should consider incorporating measures that
would allow the sovereign debtor to demonstrate its creditworthiness (understood as both the
capacity and the willingness to pay) following the restructuring.
 The capacity to pay should be improved by the sovereign state’s improved debt profile and
stronger economic foundations, and this should be emphasized in the agreement.
 Agreements under the DWM should contemplate some ongoing payment of restructured
debt (rather than full buyback, to the extent this is a possibility), in order to demonstrate the
state’s commitment to debt payment.
Human Impact: The human impact of debt restructurings should be taken into account in
determining legitimate restructuring outcomes.
 This human impact assessment could be undertaken in light of relevant treaties and other
sources of applicable international law (including customary international law and general
principles of law).
Substantive Principles: To the extent that other substantive principles, including generally
accepted legal principles and doctrines, are implicated by particular debts, these may also be
considered in determining the permissibility of particular claims.
 These doctrines and principles may include, among others, unclean hands,
unconscionability, fraudulent transfer, and the violation of a government’s fiduciary duty to
its population.
 More generally, DWM outcomes should accord with principles of responsible lending and
borrowing, such as those laid out in the UNCTAD Principles.
Consistency: Decision-makers within a DWM should attend to the goal of promoting consistency
and coherence across restructurings, while keeping in mind the unique political and economic
situation of each sovereign debtor.
 To the extent possible, the DWM should work according to a unified set of principles and
procedures. These could initially be developed or adopted along with the establishment of
a DWM, and then extended through practice.
 Departure from standard practice should be explained and justified in line with the
broader/deeper goals of restructuring as they apply to the case at hand.
Recommendations on Impartiality
Institutional impartiality: Any institutional framework associated with a DWM should be
constructed/selected to avoid systematic bias in favor of one or another interested group.
 A DWM should ideally minimize its affiliation with parties/groups and institutions whose
interests are impacted by the DWM’s processes or decisions.
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To the extent possible, a DWM should be impartial and independent in terms of its finances,
personnel, and physical/institutional location.
If full independence is not feasible, measures should be taken to limit improper influence
and also to minimize the broader perception of bias/partiality.
The DWM’s working processes should be transparent to enhance monitoring of impartiality.

Actor Impartiality: To the extent that any DWM envisions a central role for third party decisionmakers, be they mediators/facilitators or adjudicators, the impartiality and independence of these
actors should be protected.
 Decision-makers/mediators should be independent of the negotiating parties. This is
relevant at the level of individuals and also in composing multi-person panels.
 Key actors in a DWM should be required to disclose any relationships that could lead to
bias or to the perception of bias.
 To the extent that third-party decision makers are included in a DWM, the possibility of
multi-person panels might be considered.
Informational impartiality: Care should be taken to ensure the impartiality of informational inputs
into debt restructuring to the extent possible.
 The use of indicators and debt assessments should be governed by principles and
procedures that promote the independence and objectivity of such indicators.107
 Economic and other social science models predicting the expected outcomes of
restructurings and associated measures should be selected with care. To the extent that
significant disagreement exists as to the accuracy or applicability of particular models,
feedback should be solicited to construct a comprehensive assessment.
E.2. Relevance to DWM/Restructuring Proposals
UNCTAD, among others, has long called for the development of a more coherent debt
restructuring mechanism. In 1986, the UNCTAD Secretariat’s Trade and Development Report
noted that “the lack of a well-articulated, impartial framework for resolving international debt
problems creates a considerable danger… that international debtors will suffer the worst of both
possible worlds:… being judged de facto bankrupt… largely without the benefits of receiving the
financial relief and financial reorganization that would accompany a de jure bankruptcy.”108 In
light of the financial crises of the late 1990s, the 1998 Trade and Development Report suggested
that “adoption of the principle of automatic stay for international creditors and investors is certainly
one of the most helpful steps which might be taken.”109 UNCTAD published a further review of
the issues and proposals involved in reforming the global financial architecture in 2002. This
review recommended a combination of internationally sanctioned standstills and voluntary
mechanisms, accompanied by a provision of liquidity to maintain imports and economic activity,
and a requirement of private participation when official financing went above threshold levels.110
Since then, a number of more formal proposals for dealing with sovereign debt problems, which
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provide a greater degree of specificity about the institutional grounding for a workout mechanism,
have been developed by other multilateral and non-governmental organizations. It is not feasible
to discuss all of them, or even any one of them in detail, given the scope of this paper. However, a
preliminary assessment of these proposals against principles of legitimacy and impartiality remains
worthwhile. As part of this consideration, it is important to keep in mind that legitimacy and
impartiality are hardly the only relevant standards for evaluation. Feasibility has a virtue all itself,
and indeed several proposals admit that they are non-ideal or second best.111 UNCTAD of course
is currently engaged in a project to clarify how debt workout principles might be applied in the
complex contemporary global context.112
A Statutory SDRM Based at the IMF
The core statutory SDRM proposal remains that presented by Anne Krueger in 2001-2002 and
ultimately rejected by the IMF board in 2003. 113 Indeed, recent developments in the NML v.
Argentina case have encouraged key institutional players and prominent economists to suggest that
it might be resuscitated. 114 This proposal was organized primarily around the creation of a
Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution Forum (SDDRF), which would serve as the primary actor and
decision-maker on any debt restructuring plan, presenting plans for approval by creditor groups.
The SDDRF as proposed was heavily embedded in the IMF itself, with the key decision-makers
selected out of a pool pre-screened by the IMF Board or an IMF-appointed selection panel.
Furthermore, the IMF’s own loans (like those of other multilateral organizations) would not be
subject to restructuring through the process.
 The primary benefit of the SDDRF idea was its capacity to aggregate the treatment of all
private debt into a single forum. Furthermore, it would ensure that any agreement reached
would be enforceable by virtue of the role of the IMF, requiring an amendment of the IMF
Articles of Agreement which would effectively bind all countries.
 However, this proposal was criticized as being especially partial. Although it is intended to
be independent, institutional and actor links to the IMF might bias the SDDRF and, just
importantly, might aggravate the general perception that is may be biased. Furthermore, the
exclusion of debt owed to multilateral organizations (including to the IMF) would only
deepen concerns of unfairness, including among creditors.
 These concerns do not immediately doom such a proposal. Were this or another similar
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mechanism able to achieve desirable economic outcomes for debtors and creditors, at least
in dealing with private debt, while remaining attentive to substantive principles and human
impact concerns, this might balance against concerns about impartiality. However, this
might be a fairly high threshold, particularly in light of the historical experience of some
debtors with IMF involvement in 1980s and 1990s debt restructurings.
Updated IMF-Based Sovereign Debt Adjustment Facility (SDAF)
This proposal, published by the Brookings Institution in October 2013, is designed to further two
goals: (1) to commit the Fund not to bail out countries with unsustainable debts in the absence of a
restructuring; and (2) to protect countries restructuring under the SDAF from holdouts.115
 It shares some features of the earlier SDRM, most notably being housed in the IMF itself,
using a modification of the IMF Articles of Agreement as an institutional hook and as
leverage against holdouts, and reliance upon IMF technical expertise (including for
sustainability determinations, etc.).
 However, the SDAF does not envision an associated tribunal for claims determinations, an
automatic stay on litigation, or a mechanism to bind all creditors. (Holdouts would be
prevented from collecting on judgments, though their legal claims would technically remain
intact.) In addition, the proposed restructuring process itself seems to leave more in the
hands of sovereign debtors.
 The authors explicitly acknowledge the preferability of a comprehensive (and presumably
more impartial) insolvency court but consider that development to be a remote possibility.
They propose that locating an updated DWM in the IMF is most likely to be feasible and
effective.
Ad Hoc Debt Arbitration
A range of DWM proposals have been grounded in the more informal process of ad hoc arbitration.
Jürgen Kaiser highlights that these extra-legal processes generally share the key features of
relatively low cost, party autonomy, confidentiality, and attentiveness to balancing parties’ interests
(rather than according with legal principles and precedent).116 However, significant variation is
possible within this general framework, given that parties may adopt different sets of rules or
principles for the arbitration.
 Because of its informal nature, ad hoc arbitration has the potential to ensure party
ownership. Arbitrator selection procedures could be monitored to ensure impartiality.
 Although it is not required, parties may nonetheless agree to apply a body of law—such as
international law, including general principles of law applicable to sovereign debtor
relations—in their arbitration.
 One version of this ad hoc approach, proposed initially by Kunibert Raffer in 1990, would
involve the adoption of procedures akin to US municipal bankruptcy (Title 11, Chapter 9 of
the US Code), which include core elements of procedural fairness and transparency while

115

Buchheit et al., n. 111, 32-35. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/10/sovereign-debt.
Other authors include Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati, Ugo Panizza, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer.
116
Jürgen Kaiser, “Resolving Sovereign Debt Crises: Towards a Fair and Transparent International Insolvency
Framework,” Global Policy and Development Study, October 2013, 19.

38





making allowance for the sovereign character of the debtor.117
Because of their voluntary nature, ad hoc arbitration processes may not be able to compel
unwilling/hold-out creditors to participate in negotiations.
o This might be the case even if they are established with a view to enabling
comprehensive participation (as in the Chapter 9 proposal) and even if the awards
themselves are ultimately enforceable (through the New York Convention on
Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards).
As a correlate to ad hoc arbitration, a forum could be set up to promote early debtorcreditor dialogue and impartially develop a store of knowledge on best practices in
sovereign debt restructuring. This is the core of the 2014 proposal from Richard Gitlin and
Brett House to establish a Sovereign Debt Forum.118

International Insolvency Tribunal
In these proposals, arbitration would be housed at an impartial international institution (i.e. one not
itself implicated in sovereign lending), such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) or
through the auspices of the UN Secretary General or another impartial UN agency.119
 Establishment of such a tribunal would be through treaty, which would also ensure the
compliance of countries and private creditors within countries.
 Proceedings and substantive outcomes, including the assessment of restructuring plans,
would be governed by agreed-upon law, likely international law including general
principles of law applicable to sovereign debt.
 The tribunal would be able to hear particular debt claims and would be required to comply
with international standards for participation and transparency.
 This proposal may be considered the most legitimate and perhaps the most impartial.
However, it is (maybe as a result) the most ambitious of the proposals, and likely to be the
most difficult to implement.
E.3. Obstacles and Final Considerations
Unfortunately, several features of the sovereign debt system that make the establishment of a
DWM imperative are precisely the same features that constitute major obstacles to its
establishment. This section will highlight several of these special challenges and suggest
possibilities for mitigating their effects.
The Selective Efficacy of Fragmentation
Forum fragmentation is broadly acknowledged as a key problem in sovereign debt restructuring,
preventing a comprehensive treatment of a sovereign’s debt. However, it is possible that any
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particular forum (i.e. Paris Club, bond restructuring committees) does serve a function for the
particular creditors at issue.
 In particular, within a narrower/smaller forum, creditors may have greater control and may
be able to work more efficiently, and there is no requirement that they attend to the
concerns of other creditors. This can ease negotiations from the creditor perspective, as
negotiations will be less complex and more dyadic (i.e. between just the debtor and the
relevant forum group) than they would be in a consolidated multi-party framework. As
such, a fragmented system may be effective/functional for a sub-set of key actors.
 To the extent that this is the case, and particularly if those actors are not committed to longrun sovereign debtor concerns or the public good, there may be minimal incentive for such
creditors/actors to agree to an alternative, more comprehensive, and more coherent DWM.
While it is clear that a DWM would be in the best interest of sovereign debtors, attention
could be paid to highlighting the benefits to particular creditor groups of a DWM.
Opposition of Private Creditors
Private creditor groups have historically been resistant to the establishment of a DWM or indeed to
any greater institutionalization of debt restructuring. The Institute for International Finance (IIF),
representing the interests of private creditors, prefers an ongoing commitment to voluntary, good
faith negotiations.
 The IIF expresses particular concern that any unilateral debtor invocation of a stand-still
mechanism, including one condoned by the IMF, would “severely undermine creditor
property rights and market confidence and thus raise secondary bond market premiums for
the debtor involved and other debtors in similar circumstances” and highlights the unilateral,
non-negotiated deal offered by Argentina as being problematic.120
 The IIF advocates strengthening market-based approaches, including clarifying the meaning
of pari passu language and including aggregation clauses. However, it calls for a balance
between facilitating timely debt restructurings and protecting creditor property rights,
noting that “excessive emphasis on eliminating the possibility of holdout creditors might be
counterproductive.”121
 Working with creditor groups in DWM development and highlighting how a DWM is in the
long-run interests of creditors could help to soften the opposition of such groups, although
it is unlikely to eliminate such resistance altogether. Acknowledging the ways in which
such actors may be (and historically have been) structurally suspicious of insolvency
ideas—including of successful domestic insolvency regimes prior to their establishment—
may help to keep remaining opposition in perspective.
Concerns of Major Public Actors, including Bilateral and Multilateral Creditors
It is also possible that certain public actors may resist any movement toward a DWM that limits
their role, even while accepting the general need for more comprehensive approaches to sovereign
debt restructuring.
 Essential actors such as the IMF might accept the general importance of impartiality and
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legitimacy, but highlight their own centrality/expertise in sovereign debt issues. They may
also simply resist any effort to include their debt as part of a comprehensive restructuring,
following the template of the earlier SDRM proposal.
Given the central role played by these actors, they (and their buy-in) are important for any
successful DWM. In addition, their technical expertise and global standing are essential in
particular debt restructurings. Continued engagement with these actors on the instrumental
value of perceptions of legitimacy and impartiality for any DWM may be helpful.

Debtor Resistance
It is possible that some sovereign debtors will resist the establishment of a DWM as well, due to
concerns that the existence of a DWM will raise capital costs. Indeed, comments by the IIF and
other international finance groups tend to exacerbate these fears, regardless of the degree to which
they are well-founded.
 As much as possible, it is important to minimize the stigma associated with debt
restructuring. In part, this may depend on attentiveness to the legitimating features
discussed above, and on the use of objective indicators/triggers for restructuring.
F. CONCLUSION
This discussion paper has asserted that attentiveness to the principles of legitimacy and impartiality
will be important for the ex ante establishment and ex post success of any Debt Workout
Mechanism. It has highlighted the existence of a broad audience for the determination of
legitimacy, and noted its source, process, and outcome components. It has also identified
institutional, actor, and informational understandings of impartiality, which connect to and support
legitimacy. In light of this analysis, it has reviewed the key institutional and recent historical
features of sovereign debt restructuring, which shape the current political and economic context for
DWM discussions. It has considered the degree to which these principles can be translated from
relevant domestic and international issue areas, and suggests that legitimacy and impartiality can be
understood as guiding principles of international law. Finally, the paper has presented preliminary
recommendations for instantiating these principles in a DWM and also briefly raised questions
about existing DWM proposals and obstacles to maximizing the legitimacy and impartiality of a
DWM.
The establishment of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism can be understood as a global
public good, and attentiveness to legitimacy and impartiality can maximize the benefits of any
DWM. In considering how to apply these principles, however, it is important to keep in mind that
neither are likely to be achieved perfectly in any institutional setting. Furthermore, neither
principle works on a binary basis—few institutions or practices are likely to be perfectly
legitimate/impartial or illegitimate/partial. Given that compliance with either is a matter of degree,
the goal in thinking through a DWM (or several possible DWMs) should be to include as many
features as possible that promote legitimacy and impartiality, as understood by a relatively broad
audience, while paying due regard to the balancing goals of political feasibility, timeliness, and
cost effectiveness. This admittedly high standard can serve as a guide or ideal in negotiations to
establish a more rational and coherent global debt workout mechanism for the future.
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